



Introduction and commentary by Richard Ely by Clark, Andrew Inglis & Ely, Richard
Inglis Clark’s 1888 ‘Memorandum’
on
Chinese Immigration
Introduction and commentary by Richard Ely
No one can penetrate the mysteries of Providence. But what we cannot
help seeing are two enormous overflowing reservoirs. Two rivers are
issuing from them; the white river and the yellow river, the one
fertilizing the lands through which it runs with the seeds of Christian
civilization, and the other threatening to destroy them. Already at several
points these rivers are meeting, dashing against each other and contending
for the mastery. What will be the final issue? The twentieth century will
inscribe it in its annals ...
Problems of this nature, unfortunately, do not bide men’s
convenience, and the task of dealing with the ever-flowing immigration of
Chinese cannot be relegated to the twentieth century. It is here now and
will not be denied. Our Australian kinsmen, having done as much as they
believed they could within the powers granted to them by the Imperial
Legislature to restrict and repress the tide of Chinese immigration, now
declare that these powers are insufficient for the purpose, and are crying
aloud for the aid of the British Government to enable those Anglo-Saxon
communities flourishing under the Southern Cross to preserve their ‘type
of nationality,’ and to save them from the misfortune of having in their
midst a large number of a race which could not mix with them socially or
politically; and the question of the day is how, and to what extent, can
this aid best be rendered. ...
In the industrial, and, on the whole, peaceful contest between the
white and yellow races, then, the latter appear to be winning; and the
United States and Australia are seeking to raise the barriers between the
Chinese and the rest of the world which were thrown down by the wars of
1842, 1857, and 1860. We are like a magician, whose incantations have
raised an evil spirit, but who does not know how to lay it again.
 (Chinese in Australia’, Quarterly Review, 1888, no. 2, vol. 167, pp.
163-4’.)
n 24 April 1888 Clark, as Attorney-General for Tasmania,
forwarded a memorandum to his premier, P O Fysh, on theO
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subject of Chinese immigration to the Australian colonies.1 Many
years later one of Clark’s sons, Carrel, made a large claim about this
memorandum: it ‘gave concrete utterance for the first time in an
official document of that first principle of Australianism summed up
in the phrase ‘White Australia’.2 Carrel Clark does not, however,
elaborate on this claim.
The immediate context of Clark’s memorandum was a request by
the British Foreign Office, transmitted to Australasian colonies by the
Colonial Office on 23 January 1888, requesting that each colony
provide information on ‘any exceptional legislation affecting Chinese
subjects which is in force in the Colony ... showing the objects for
which such legislation was adopted, and the measure of success which
has attended it.’3
Behind this request lay a strongly-worded complaint on 12
December 1887 to Lord Salisbury — at the time both Prime Minister
and Foreign Minister — from the Chinese Minister in London, Lew-
Ta-Jen, over colonial legislation directed at Chinese subjects migrating
to Australia.4 This, he said, was discriminatory, contrary to
‘international usage’, and incompatible with treaties between Britain
and China. He presumably referred to Article One of the Treaty of
Nankin and Article Five in the 1860 Treaty of Pekin,5 the latter of
which provided that Chinese subjects were ‘at liberty to take service in
the British Colonies’. There was, as it happened, one gap in the wall of
Australian mainland legislation restricting Chinese immigration, by
imposing a poll tax (entrance tax) and by limiting the number of
Chinese a ship may carry, which was not noticed by the Chinese
Minister. For while there was a South Australian poll tax on Chinese
immigrants (£10 per immigrant), and a provision that ships, on pain of
the shipper otherwise incurring severe penalties) carry no more than
one Chinese immigrant per ten tons, this did not apply to that
colony’s Northern Territory. Not mentioning the mainland exception
may perhaps not have been inadvertent, for that year about 1000
Chinese immigrants  entered the Territory.
In regard to the colony of Tasmania, the Chinese Minister singled
out for mention a Bill which had passed the House of Assembly, and
was presently ‘under the consideration of he Legislative Council’,
                                                
1 TPP, vol. 15, 1889-89, Paper 76: ‘Chinese Question: Correspondence and
Report of Conference held at Sydney, June, 1888.’
2 Richard Ely (ed.), Carrel Inglis Clark: The Supreme Court of Tasmania, its First
Century, 1824-1924, Hobart, 1995, p. 163.
3 TPP, vol 15, 1889, Paper 76, p. 7.
4 The text of Lew-Ta-Jen’s note is in TPP, vol. 15, 1889-89, Paper 76, p. 7.
5 Then the conventional way of spelling the name of the Chinese capital.
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which imposed on Chinese immigrants a poll tax similar to that set by
mainland colonies. As it happened, the Chinese Minister’s complaint
was a little behind the times, a very minor victim of the ‘tyranny of
distance’. That Bill, which had been introduced by into the House of
Assembly by Attorney-General Inglis Clark, received the Governor’s
assent on 7 November.
A major source of the Chinese Minister’s information about the
situation of overseas Chinese in Australian colonies would have been
an 1887 Report by Commissioners appointed by the Viceroy of
Canton.6 The Commissioners had left Canton in August 1886, and
visited Dutch and Spanish as well as British colonies. They were in
Australia from April to August 1887 and visited most colonies.7 They
were received courteously, at least most of the time.8 No Tasmanian
legislation at that time singled out Chinese arrivals, and the Chinese
population of the island was not much greater than a thousand.9 The
island’s Chinese population according to the 1881 census was 844,
while that of the remaining Australian colonies was a little under 38
000. This probably explains why the Commissioners did not visit
Tasmania. The Commissioners on return reported that Chinese were
treated better in the Australian colonies than in those of Holland and
Spain, but criticised Australian colonies for imposing an entrance tax
on Chinese.
The visit rang alarm bells for some Australian colonists. Were the
Commissioners scouts, so to speak, of an eventual Chinese thrust for
regional hegemony?  Anti-Chinese feeling was stimulated by the 1887
arrival in the Northern Territory of South Australia, of about 1000
Chinese, mostly as railway workers under contract. This was legal
since, as noted, no South Australian law prohibited entry of Chinese to
the Territory. In 1887 Anti-Chinese Leagues, mostly composed of
                                                
6 A fairly detailed summary of the Report by the Commissioners to the Imperial
Court was translated by the Shih-pao and reproduced in the C inese Times. An
abridgement of this abridgement, which is nonetheless quite detailed, is given in
the Tasmanian Mail of 19 May 1888. It is impressively candid on the motives of
the tour of inspection.
7 Useful on the visit of the Commissioners i A Markus, Fear and Hatred:
Purifying Australia and California, Sydney, 1979, pp. 131-41. Markus does not,
however, seem to have been aware of the epitome of the Report in the Chinese
Times. It is referred to, however, in M Willard, History of the White Australia
Policy to 1920, Melbourne, 1923, pp. 74-5, but the Times report is there
misdated. It should have been given as 7 May 1888, not 7 May 1887.
8 Times (London), 27 September 1887.
9 In 1887 the Tasmanian Government Statistician estimated the Chinese
population to be 1300. Mercury, 16 July 1887. (Speech of Col. St Hill at public
meeting to consider ‘the influx of Chinese’)
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working-men, quickly formed in most colonies to agitate against the
‘influx’. The news that Chinese were arriving in the Territory
overlapped with the last stage of the visit of the Chinese
Commissioners, which happened to be in Northern Queensland. Fear
of Chinese and anxiety over becoming losers in the labour market
mixed readily, often finding expression in xenophobic stereotyping.
The Commissioners were ‘slave inspectors’. They were in Queensland
‘to see if there was room for a much larger introduction of “the
yellow agony”’.10 The London Times reported a rugged
confrontation in Queensland between the Chinese Commissioners and
some members of the Anti-Chinese Leagues in which neither party
was conciliatory. As the Commissioners were about to leave Australia,
the Times reported on 27 September 1887,
the Anti-Chinese Leagues at Townsville and elsewhere sought interviews
with the Commissioners in order to urge them to prevent any more Chinese
from coming to the colony. At one place General Wong told a deputation
that, in his opinion, the Chinese were better off at home than in Queensland,
and as for the complaint that they reduced the wages of Europeans that would
be easily remedied if the Chinese had their way, for they would be only too
glad to get even higher wages than Europeans. At Townsville the anti-
Chinese deputation stated in their address ‘that Europeans could not descend
to the level of Chinese, or raise the Chinese to th ir level,’ and that if
Chinese immigration were not stopped Queensland would become an
undesirable place of residence for the Chinese.
The combination of racial insult and the implied future threat to
Chinese immigrants was provocative. The Commissioners, perhaps
because they were so soon to leave the colonies’ shores, allowed
themselves to be stirred into telling the deputation what, in one sense, it
must have been  hoping to hear:
General Wong appeared annoyed at these observations, and put an end to the
interview by remarking that when he got back to China something would be
done for better or worse that would be fit for Queensland. After this
enigmatical utterance the Commission left for Hong Kong, whence it will
proceed to Pekin to report to the Emperor.
Many colonists by April 1888 were mindful of two other
developments. By then the Colonial Office’s ‘Please explain’ request
                                                
10 C Cronin, ‘The Yellow Agony’, in R Evans, K Saunders & K Cronin, Race
Relations in Colonial Queensland: a History of Exclusion, Exploitation and
Extermination, Brisbane, 1975, pp. 314, 339, fn. 685.
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of 23 January had been received. Accompanied by the letter of
complaint by the Chinese Minister to Britain which, citing Britain’s
treaty obligations and the law of nations, it in effect called into
question the legal power of a self-governing colonies to regulate
admission of Chinese immigrants to its territory. The other
development had the potential, in the long run, to raise the numbers of
Chinese seeking entry to Australian colonies. In March 1888 the
United States was reported to have concluded a treaty with China
under which entry of Chinese labourers into the United States was
prohibited. Chinese migration to the United States had been extensive
since mid-century gold rushes. In 1890 the Chinese population of
California officially stood at over 70 000.11 In the circumstances it was
natural for some to ask: where might the outward flow of Chinese
migrants now turn?12 If the treaty between the United States and China
were to become a model for a similar agreement between Britain and
China, with respect to Chinese immigration to the Australasian
colonies, it was good news; if not, not.
A sense of collective insecurity posed by the double isolation of the
colonies — from Britain and from each other — is well attested. A
pointer to the level of popular anxiety in 1888 is the sometimes
panicky response to the severing, from 29 June to 12 July, f the
undersea cable linking the colonies to Europe. Was it sabotage? Was a
Russian or Chinese attack in the offing? Well, the answer was No in
each case, and hindsight suggests that this ought to have been obvious.
That, to many, it was not obvious, should be food for thought. That
Gillies, the Victorian Premier, ordered naval precautions to be taken,
should be matter for reflection, too. Given the wealth by world
standards of most Australian colonies, the accelerating European turn
towards territorial acquisition from the 1870s, and Japanese and
Chinese naval expansion by the late 1880s, it was not altogether
paranoiac for Australian colonists to see their colonies as plums which
Britain’s rivals would pick, if they could. Nor is ‘paranoiac’ quite the
right word for fear by British-Australian labourers, tradesmen and
small capitalists of competition from immigrant Chinese workers and
small-scale entrepreneurs. That Chinese labour was formidably
competitive was widely believed — and sometimes demonstrably true.
                                                
11 Markus, Fear and Hatred, p. 107.
12 In the second half of 1888 the Imperial Chinese government declined to ratify
the treaty, but Congress then quickly passed an Act (the Scott Act) which placed
stringent limitations on Chinese immigration. See Mary Coolidge, Chinese
Immigration, New York, 1909, pp. 197-201. (Photographically reproduced in
1968 by the Cheng-Wen Publishing Company, Taipei, 1968)
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Chinese dominance of some industries, such as furniture-making,
laundering and supplying fruit and vegetables, was a major theme of
extensive reporting in the 1880s of the economic impact of Chinese
immigrant labour in California.13
The Memorandum
The second paragraph is the first substantive one. Clark sets out the
main provisions of the 1887 Tasmanian Act to regulate and restrict
Immigration of Chinese to Tasmania. Summarised, these were:
no vessel could bring in more than one Chinese to every hundred
tons;
a poll tax of £10 was payable on every Chinese carried;
non-payment of this tax by the master, in respect o Chinese
immigrants landed, made him liable for a penalty of £20 for each
one, as well as forfeiture of his vessel;
no tax was payable in respect of Chinese crew-members not
discharged in the colony.14
                                                
13 Generalisations in this discussion are largely drawn from, but not always based
on: M Willard, History of the White Australia Policy to 1920, chs 3 & 4; S
Bennett, The Making of the Commonwealth, Melbourne, 1971, pp. 48-62.
Bennett quotes a short extract from Clark’s ‘Chinese Immigration’ — mainly,
his analysis of the dangers posed to a civil order of European type by extended
immigration of a group unwilling to adapt to the local political culture; C Price,
The Great Walls are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and
Australasia, 1836-1888, Canberra, 1974; P Sidebottom, ‘Racism of the
Righteous: Tasmanian Attitudes to the Chinese Question in Australia’, BA
(hons), Department of History, University of Tasmania, 1974; A Curthoys & A
Markus (eds), Who are Our Enemies? Racism and the Working Class in Australia,
Sydney, 1978 (especially essays by Curthoys and Markey); E Rolls, Sojourner :
The Epic Story of China’s Centuries-old Relationship with Australia, Brisbane,
1992; A Yarwood & M Knowling, Race Relations in Australia: A History,
Sydney, 1983; A Markus & M Ricklefs (eds), Surrender Australia: Essays in the
Study and Use of History: Geoffrey Blainey and Asian Immigration, Sydney,
1985 (Especially essays by A Curthoys and G Davison.); R Markey, The Making
of the Labor Party in New South Wales, 1880-1900, ch. 1 , Sydney, 1988. On
Australian interpretations of and responses to effects of Chinese immigration in
California, see A Markus, Fear and Hatred, passim; and C Price, Restrictive
Immigration, passim. For an example of what many would then have seen as
responsible discussion of implications for the Australian colonies of
developments in California, see the Melbourne Age, 14, 18 and 30 June, 6 July
and 8 August 1887. 
14 51 Vic no. 9.
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In paragraphs three and four, respecting the objective of the law,
Clark stated that the ‘influx of Chinese into Tasmania’ did not reflect
that ‘local necessity for restrictive legislation’ evident in some other
colonies. However, he added, ‘additional discoveries of tin, silver, and
gold’ in the colony might alter this situation. That apart, there were
what one might call sentimental and quasi-legal considerations — the
federal dimension. The ‘natural and mutual amity existing between
Tasmania and the other Australian colonies’, and the form of
‘federation’ already linking some of them under the 1885 Federal
Council of Australasia Act, made it incumbent upon Tasmania not to
let
itself be used as a temporary residence by Chinese immigrants for the
purpose of obtaining letters of naturalization so that they might thereafter
obtain admission into other colonies without paying the poll tax or
complying with the other restrictions imposed by the Legislatures of those
colonies upon Chinese immigrants.
In paragraph four Clark criticises the Chinese Minister’s claim that
colonial legislation which, in a discriminative way, restricted Chinese
immigration, was in breach of international law. Clark later made clear
(paragraph six) that in this rebuttal he was referring to self-governing
colonies. Paragraph four stated:
The reference made by His Excellency the Chinese Minister to Her Majesty’s
international engagements induces me to observe that the exceptional
legislation that has been adopted by the majority of the Australasian
Colonies on the subject of Chinese immigration does not violate any
recognised rule of international comity; on the contrary, it is a fundamental
maxim of International Law that ‘every state has the right to regulate
immigration to its territories as is most convenient to the safety and
prosperity of the country, without regard to the Municipal Law of the
country whence the foreign immigration proceeds.’ (See Ferguson’s Manual
International Law, vol. 1, page 130, and Calvo’s Dr it Intern, vol. 1, liv.
viii)
Her Majesty’s international engagements’ here meant Article Five of
the 1860 Treaty between Britain and China. Clark’s use of the word
‘state’ without qualification, to designate self-governing colonies has
nationalist and perhaps republican connotations, although Clark, at
other times, did defer to what he called the ‘great and mighty fact’
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that ‘our legislative bodies are subordinate to the British Parliament,
with their laws liable to be overruled by that Parliament.’15
In paragraph six Clark cumbersomely, yet interestingly, addressed
the question of how and why restrictive immigration laws in the self-
governing colonies came to be passed. While admitting that the effect
of restrictive legislation in the ‘self-governing’ colonies was ‘to
exclude Chinese from competition with Australasian artisans and
labourers in the Colonial labour market’, he denies that this result
‘was simply’ the object of such legislation. What did he mean? There
are two clues. One is Clark’s denial that restrictive legislation  was ‘the
fruit of their [the self-governing colonies’] democratic institutions’.
The other is his statement that ‘it is beyond doubt that in none of the
Australasian colonies would the artisans and labourers have sufficient
power or influence to obtain restrictive legislation on this question if
they were not aided by the convictions of the majority of the other
members of the community that such legislation is necessary for its
present or future welfare.’ Two comments are immediately in point.
The first is that Clark seems to equivocate between necessary and
sufficient conditions. The second, and this is what makes the
paragraph conceptually challenging, is that Clark concurrently denies
that restrictive legislation was the fruit of democratic institutions and
affirms it to be a product of a kind of civic-welfare-minded majority.
This dual claim bears closely on an issue Roe discusses in his
introductory essay in this book, namely, in what sense was Clark a
democrat? A question is: does Clark write here not fundamentally as a
democrat but as a Commonwealth man? if that is a more comfortable
way to describe this ‘democrat by despair’, how does the term need to
be defined.
The pressing need, as Clark proceeds to explain, was to protect the
‘civilisation and structure of society now existing in these Colonies’
from the ‘unparalleled fixedness of character’ of the Chinese. The
fixity of that ‘character’, Clark concludes after a rather complex
argument, would prevent them from ever becoming ‘constituent
portions of a homogeneal community retaining the European type of
civilization’. (Perhaps it was these words Carrel Clark had in mind in
describing his father as a pioneer of the White Australia Policy.)
In paragraphs seven and eight Clark wrote:
7. Both the virtues and the vices of the Chinese are br d in them by a
civilization stretching back in an unparalleled fixedness of character and detail
                                                
15 Official Record of the Proceedings and Debates of the National Australasian
Convention, Sydney, 1891, p. 123.
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to an age more remote than any to which the beginnings of any European
nation can be traced, and the experience of both America and Australasia
prove that no length of residence amidst a population of European descent
will cause the Chinese immigrants who remain unnaturalized to change the
mode of life or relinquish the practices that they bring with them from their
native country. It is consequently certain that if the unnaturalized Chinese
should at any time become as numerous, or nearly as numerous,in any
colony as the residents of European origin, the result would be either an
attempt on the part of the Chinese to establish separate institutions of a
character that would trench on the supremacy of the present legislative and
administrative authorities, or a tacit acceptance by them of an inferior social
and political position which, associated with the avocations that the majority
of them would probably follow, would create a combined political and
industrial division of society upon the basis of racial distinction. This would
inevitable produce in themajority of the remainder of the population a
degraded estimate of manual labour similar to that which has always existed
in those communities where African slavery has been permitted, and thereby
call into existence a class similar in habit and character to the ‘mean whites’
of the Southern States of the American Union before the Civil War.
Societies so divided produce particular vices in exaggerated proportions, and
are doomed to certain deterioration.
8. The alternative supposition that the Chinese immigrants would apply for
and obtain letters of naturalization and so acquire political equality with the
remainder of the population, suggests a result equally menacing to the
permanence of the civilization and structure of society now existing in these
Colonies, inasmuch as the indurated and renitent character of the habits and
conceptions of the Chinese immigrants make their amalgamation with the
populations of European origin, so as to become constituent portions of a
homogeneal community retaining the European type of civilization, an
impossibility.
In the last paragraph Clark draws together the threads of his
argument to suggest that the United States showed the way forward:
9. The foregoing considerations invest the restrictive and prohibitory
measures of the Australasian Colonies against Chinese immigration with a
sanction that Her Majesty’s Government cannot fail to recognise as sufficient
to promote its intervention to obtain from the Court of Pekin a co-operation
in the prevention of the emigration of its subjects to the Australasian
Colonies similar to that which it is stated has been obtained by the
Government of the United States in regard to the immigration of Chinese
into America.
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Commentary
In retrospect, the outcome of the 1888 response of the Australian
colonies to the Chinese ‘threat’, in which response Clark’s
Memorandum occupied a brief moment, was the status ante quem.
There was little alteration either to the rate of Chinese immigration or
to the wall of restrictive colonial legislation designed to prevent the
feared ‘influx’. In contrast to the swamping of the Palmer goldfield in
Queensland in the mid-1870s (by 1877 there were 17 000 Chinese on
that field to 1400 Europeans),16 on the Western Australian goldfields
in the 1890s the anti-Chinese ‘wall’ held firm. Chinese did not get a
look-in. By the late-1890s Japan, which had defeated China militarily
in 1895, featured in the perception of many colonials as a more potent
threat to Australia than China. Under pressure from the British
Government which in 1894 entered a commercial treaty with Japan,
some colonies in the late 1890s removed from their immigration
restriction legislation the designation of any particular race. Instead,
an education test, modelled on that used for some years by the colony
of Natal, was to be administered by a customs officer in ways
dependent on the discretion of that officer. This was represented by
Britain as more tactful, but the same discriminative outcome was
ensured. In 1901 a version of the Natal test was established under the
Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act.17
Wide-ranging militant protest by petty-bourgeois and working class
anti-Chinese leagues in 1887 and 1888, especially but far from only
in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne, makes clear that fear of a
Chinese ‘influx’ cut deep. Clark recognised this in his Memorandum,
although seeing restriction as more fundamentally justifiable on
higher, way-of-life, grounds.
Clark’s Memorandum gained him some esteem beyond Tasmania,
perhaps the first time this happened. The Memorandum was reprinted
in the Sydney Morning Herald of May 15 and called ‘exceedingly
able’. But it was not, despite Carrel Clark’s claim to the contrary, a
pioneering statement of the first principle of Australianism as summed
up in the phrase ‘White Australia’. The phrase itself, according to the
Australian National Dictionary, dates only from the late 1890s. None
of the substantive points Clark made were novel, and the main
historical interest of the Memorandum, now, is the light it throws on
Clark’s views and values. 
                                                
16 Markus, Fear and Hatred, p. 73.
17 Willard, White Australia Policy to 1920, pp. 108-118.
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Clark’s Nationalism
In a confidential dispatch of 8 February 1889 the British Colonial
Secretary Lord Knutsford forwarded to the Governor of Tasmania a
confidential Foreign Office paper on the ‘Chinese Question’. The
writer was E H Parker of the Chinese Consular Service. It was a
formidably well-informed essay, and showed a talent for the aphoristic
overview.  For instance, ‘The struggle is in fact between the labourers
of Canton — backed, perhaps by the Viceroy [of Canton] — and
those of Australia, — backed by the politicians.’18 Cl rk considered
other and larger issues to be at stake.
Clark’s view that under international law each Australian self-
governing colony was, in respect to immigration, a state, with a state’s
right to regulate such immigration, was, as Clark of course knew, a
challenge to the Imperial exercise of the Reserve Power, and perhaps
republican in its tendency. However in high colonial political circles,
on the touchy Chinese immigration question, a kind of ambit or covert
republicanism was not uncommon in the 1880s. Two examples suffice
to make the point. Sir Henry Parkes in his long career in olonial
politics mostly wore an empire-loyalist hat, but on the issue of the
threat of a Chinese ‘influx’ he could don a republican one. In mid-
May 1888 a boatload of Chinese immigrants (on the ‘Afghan’) had
arrived in Sydney Harbour. Sometimes rowdy anti-Chinese protesters
milled in the streets of Sydney. Parkes, probably hoping to strengthen
his electoral standing, introduced an Influx of Chinese Restriction
Bill.19 He was proud enough of his speech to the Legislative Assembly
to reproduced it in his 1892 Fifty Years in the Making of Australian
History.20  This perhaps suggests that more lay b hind the role he
thereby carved than mere opportunism, the mere will to become the
mouth of the mob. Among much else Parkes said:
Neither for her Majesty’s ships of war, nor for her Majesty’s representative
on the spot, nor for Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, do we
intend to step aside from or purpose, which is to terminate the landing of
Chinese on these shores for ever.
                                                
18 Archives of Tasmania, GO 4,1, Despatches 1860-1899, (Confidential) Report
on Chinese by E H Parker, Chinese Consular Service, forwarded by Lord
Knutsford to Gov. R Hamilton, 8 February 1889.
19 Markus, Fear and Hatred, pp. 143-5’ John Hirst, The Sentimental Nation: The
Making of the Australian Commonwealth, Melbourne, 2000, p. 84.
20 London, 1892, vol. 2. See especially p. 221.
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The other example is Sir Samuel Griffith, who like Parkes
sometimes chafed at subordination to Britain.21 When the Foreign
Office through the Colonial Office issued its ‘Please explain’ note to
the Australasian colonies on 23 January 1888, the Memorandum of
response for Queensland was written by Griffith, then Premier. It has a
double interest. The first is that like Clark he refers to his colony as a
‘State’ under international law, entitled to protect itself against
incursion. The second is that a copy of Griffith’s memorandum was in
Clark’s hands before he wrote his own. Clark’s argument is similar
enough to that of Griffith to make it likely that Clark used Griffith’s
memorandum as a model. Griffith wrote:
There can be no doubt, I think, that the public opinion of Australia is firmly
and resolutely opposed to the further introduction of Chinese, and it has
become a matter of pressing moment to devise the best and most efficacious
means, acting within the rules of international comity, of excluding them.
I conceive, however, that there is no rule, either of international law or
comity, which requires one nation to admit within its borders, against its
will, the subjects of another. Instances have not been infrequent of the
exclusion of persons of alien nationalities from various European States; and,
although it has not been the practice of the British Government to follow
these examples, I apprehend that the principle of self-preservation would
compel any State to prevent an invasion, whether hostile or peaceful, by
subjects of another State, which would be injurious to its own subjects.22
Probably the most concise statement of Clark’s vision of an
independent Australian national life is in his unpublished essay, ‘The
Future of the Australian Commonwealth’, which dates from late 1902
or 1903, and is reproduced elsewhere in this book. Clark begins by
picturing the future with a very broad brush: the universe as a whole
was evolving dynamically towards individualisation, and this evolution
was both inorganic and organic. On the organic level, individualisation
related to the sentient in general, and the human in particular. The
culmination of human individualisation was formation of
‘consanguineous and homolingual communities’. This phase found
expression in the emergence of separate sovereignties. Australia was
part of a sovereign community — the British Empire — but moving
                                                
21 Hirst, The Sentimental Nation, pp. 26-30.
22 Mainstream colonial newspapers, too, could toy with the idea of cutting the
painter, if Britain resolutely endorsed the protest of the Chinese Commissioners
over Australian immigration restriction laws. The Age stated editorially on 8
August 1887 that if the Colonial Office joined the Chinese protest the Australian
colonies would need to choose between submission and independence.
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towards national individuality and sovereignty of its own. Eventually,
if Australia stayed on track, it would display to the world one of the
‘types of human excellence’. Imperial federation, by contrast, was not
the evolutionary way forward; and the idea of a ‘world state’ was
premature. National evolution should take precedence.
In an ideal world composed of nations who clearly saw that the highest
interests of each of them were to be found in universal peace and mutual
cooperation in the advancement of human welfare, patriotism might give
place to humanitarianism and the world state of Bluntschi might be realized.
Rhetorically, the word ‘might’ is most naturally read as ‘might just
possibly’.
How far did Australia have to travel to obtain true national
sovereignty? In ‘The Future of the Australian Commonwealth’ it is
striking that Clark does not mention what he regarded, in ‘Why I am a
Democrat’, as the hallmark of a truly civil society — full recognition
of human rights — or at least he does not do so explicitly. At most,
such recognition might be alluded to in the essay’s vision of the
human future as ‘separate aggregates located in diverse physical
environments and evolving distinct types of human excellence in
association with distinct political organizations.’ Given that the future
horizons charted in ‘Future of the Australian Commonwealth’ are
emphatically national ones, it does not surprise that Clark sees
restriction of Asian immigration to Australia as still important: ‘The
geographical position of the Commonwealth and its industrial and
social interest,’ he notes with evident satisfaction, ‘have produced
already special legislation in reference to the immigration of Asiatic
aliens’. Evidently, between 1888 and 1902-3, he remained convinced
of the need to head off national dangers posed by Asiatic migration.
Clearly, in 1887-8, he did not see the civil structures of the colonies as
robust enough to survive an Asian ‘influx’. He may have taken the
same view of the civil structures of the new Commonwealth.
A question which these reflections pose is: How far does ‘Why I am
a Democrat’, despite the seeming universalisabity of Clark’s plea for
the ‘democratic ideal’, apply only within ‘separate sove eignties in
distinct communities of the same genealogical origin and using the
same language’? Are there two Clarks: Clark the citizen, and Clark the
patriot — the former fearful of dangers within, the latter of dangers
without? Or was there just one Clark, but owning two hats, neither of
one which fitted perfectly?
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Clark on the Chinese
The view that virtues and vices of Chinese were ‘bred in them by a
civilisation stretching back in an unparalleled fixedness of character
and detail’ to remote ages, was widely held in educated European
circles in the nineteenth century, although the implicit criteria of value,
and the alleged fact, were ever contested. Belief in what Clark called
the ‘indurated’ (meaning something like obdurate or indelible) and
‘renitent (meaning something like inflexible or recalcitrant) character
of Chinese migrants was a corollary of this general view. Those two
adjectives were about as rare in Clark’s time as now, and a long search
has not disclosed a theorising  context where Clark might have found
them, or indeed, if they were borrowed from such a context at all. A
search through writings of J S Mill and Herbert Spencer, both of
whom Clark greatly admired, yielded no result. Nor did more
extended forays. More were possible, but life is short.
Clark also stated what comes to much the same thing: that Chinese
were incapable of relinquishing ‘the practices that they bring with
them’, and that — which perhaps follows by definition — it was ‘an
impossibility’ for them to ‘become constituent portions of a
homogeneal community retaining the European type of civilisation’.
‘Homogeneal’ is a Greek-derived compound whose connotation f
shared ancestry or background is similar to that of the Latin-derived
‘nation’. The connotation of the phrase ‘consanguineous and
homolingual communities’ in ‘Future of the Australian
Commonwealth’ is much the same.
Among those who shared Clark’s view that Chinese were simply
not assimilable to what has recently been called the civil-society
project was J S Mill. Mill’s views on most matters (but conspicuously
not religion, in which Clark remained an inveterate quester for
spiritual dimensions) were greatly admired by Clark. Mill, in his 1859
essay, On Liberty, with which Clark must have been familiar,
contrasted the ‘despotism of custom’ with ‘the progressive principle’.
A ‘warning example’ of the despotism of custom, Mill wrote, was
China. That country was
a nation of much talent, and, in some respects, even wisdom, owing to the
rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a
particularly good set of customs, the work, in some measure, of men to
whom even the most enlightened European must accord, under certain
limitations, the title of sages and philosophers. They are remarkable, too, in
the excellence of their apparatus for impressing, as far as possible, the best
wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community, and securing that
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those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honour and
power. Surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human
progressiveness, and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of the
movement of the world. On the contrary, they have become stationary —
have remained so for thousands of years; ...
A study of China was cautionary. It discloses to Europeans a
nightmare prospect. The Chinese, Mill continued,
have succeeded beyond all hope in what English philanthropists are so
industriously working at — in making a people all alike, governing their
thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules; ... The modern régime
of public opinion [in Europe] is, in an unorganised form, what the Chinese
educational and political systems are in an organised; and unless individuality
shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke, Europe,
notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed Christianity, will tend
to become another China.23
Bearing in mind Clark’s solicitude for minorities threatened by the
tyranny of majorities, as expressed in ‘Why I am a Democrat’ and
‘Denominational Education’,24 it is reasonable to wonder how far the
vehemence of Clark’s representation of the threat Chinese
immigration posed draws on civil libertarianism akin to Mill’s, as well
as on the solicitude expressed in the 1888 Memorandum for the
welfare of ‘the civilization and structure of society now existing in
these colonies’.
Low ratings of Chinese culture and civilization in much of what
would pass in the nineteenth century as learned literature on China are
relevant as context to Clark because, among an increasingly literate
colonial population, they were, directly or through the press, a
common source of images of China. If one consults articles on China
in such compendia of scholarship as Chambers’s Information for the
People (1841-), Chambers’s Encyclopædia (1874), or the ninth
edition (1876) of Encyclopædia Britannica,25 one finds reference to a
                                                
23 From Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, Everyman’s Library,
London, 1968, p. 129.
24 And also his recently discovered essay ‘The preamble to the Constitution of the
Australian Commonwealth’. See Richard Ely, ‘Andrew Inglis Clark on the
preamble of the Australian Constitution’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 75, no.
1, 2001, p. 38.
25 Useful generally is C Mackerras, We tern Images of China, Hong Kong, 1991.
On representations of China in nineteenth century encyclopedias, see pp. 59-
61. The balance of praise and blame is struck more favourably to the Chinese in
Chambers’s Encyclopædia than in the other two encyclopedias mentioned in the
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form of government which is despotic, to pious and unquestioning
habituation of the populace at large to despotism, to inveterate
adherence to old ways in preference to new, to habituated deference to
ancient laws which are often arbitrary and cruel, to habitual
untruthfulness, to a tendency pilfer, to infanticide, and to cruel
treatment of women through footbinding. Against these national
disgraces, as they are implied to be, are set a few points worthy of
praise: inculcation of filial obedience (from which it is sometimes
stated the young of the West could learn), hospitableness on a person-
to-person level, cleverness in some arts and crafts, agricultural skills
and techniques of a high order, and an examination system which, at
least to an extent, is meritocratic. For some, it opens the pathway to
high offices in the state.
From the 1850s in California and the Australian colonies, populist
expressions of opposition to Chinese migration often portrayed them
as racially inferior, morally depraved, filthy in their habits and unfitted
to participate in the British style of civil and community life. Odd-
looking strangers, who rarely spoke English and usually kept to their
own, were economically successful often enough for this to success to
grate and sometimes worry.26 ‘Celestials’ as they were often called, a
nick-name often more contemptuous than might nowadays appear,
posed a threat by their presence as competitors. But China itself, until
around the 1870s, was rarely seen as a danger. There were, as there
always are, exceptions, as with John Pascoe Fawkner’s fear in 1857
that Australian colonies might become the ‘property’ of the Chinese
emperor,27 or Parkes’s remark in 1861 that that Chinese believed that
eventually this country would be theirs.28 But it is evident in Charles
Price’s detailed analysis, in his fine The Great White Walls are Built,
of debates in Australian colonial parliaments, that this kind of claim
was rare. In any event the invasion Parkes, but perhaps not Fawkner,
had in mind was a process not an Act of State.
However in the 1870s the balance of elements in anti-Chinese
imagery and rhetoric begins to shift. Still expressed in that imagery
and rhetoric is resentment of and resistance to often severe
competition from Chinese labour — on mining fields, in towns (as in
                                                                                                             
text. Brief but helpful on Australian colonial stereotyping of Chinese is ch. 4 of
David Walker’s Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia, 1850-1939,
‘One hundred work as one’.
26 D Goodman, Gold Seeking: Victoria and California in the 1850s, Sydney, 1994;
Markus, Fear and Hatred; Coolidge, Chinese Immigration; J Ch’en, China and
the West: Society and Culture, 1815-1937, London, 1979, ch. 1.
27 Price, The Great White Walls are Built, p. 100.
28 Ibid., p. 83.
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utility furniture-making and cabinet making in some towns, where
Chinese products were often cheaper and better and drove older
workshops to the wall), and occasionally on coastal shipping — it now
develops an international dimension.
It turned out that European treaties with China in the middle
decades of the nineteenth century which, in material terms suchas
trading rights, greatly favoured European powers carried remoter
strategic consequence whose eventual force was widely
underestimated: China, as a high contracting party to these treaties, was
thereby recognised as a sovereign state within the comity of nations,
and, in consequence, possessed of rights potentially assertible under
international law. China (huge by any standards) began to command
respect internationally.
Nonetheless, the magnitude and speed of the ‘invasion’ of the
Palmer gold field in Queensland by Chinese diggers in 1876-7
shocked many Queenslanders. So rapidly did Chinese arrive that, at
first, they dominated the field. A literal Chinese invasion was feared by
some. It was reported that China now had a large fleet, ‘commanded
by officers who had been in the British and other European service’.29
One petition to parliament stated that the
foreign policy of ... [China] is becoming daily more aggressive, and the
increase of surplus population so excessive, that at any time hordes of
thousands or even millions of Chinese may be expected to be flung forth on
... the North Coast.30
Imperial solicitude for the welfare of Chinese subjects abroad was
manifested by the visit by Chinese Commissioners in 1886-7 to South-
East Asia and the Australian colonies to inspect the condition of
Chinese immigrants. Assertion of the rights of these subjects in the
Australian colonies, a  Chinese immigrants, was the point of the 1887
complaint about their treatment made by the Chinese Minister to the
British Foreign Office. It is much in point that, as context o this
imperial assertiveness, China was, and was known to be, building a
formidable naval squadron. Imperial Chinese assertiveness was more
often echoed among Chinese abroad. An example is a remonstrance
addressed by five Chinese merchants resident in Melbourne to the
June 1888 inter-colonial conference, at Sydney, on the ‘Chinese
Question’. The five felt free to say
                                                
29 Cronin, ‘The Yellow Agony’, p. 257.
30 Ibid. Cronin gives a good detailed account of the ‘scare’, Ibid., pp. 254-265. See
also, Price, The Great Walls are Built, pp. 159-60.
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that a time may come, nay will come sooner than is supposed, when the
presence and power of China as a great nation will be felt in these seas, and it
lies with you to say, as wise men or otherwise, if this is to be for good or
evil.
That injustice, inhumanity, and violence afford a poor foundation to build
up the life of a young nation, and however popular in the meantime  it may
be with the unthinking multitude, yet we are most sure such weapons mean
disaster in the future for the users.31
In sum, anti-Chinese immigrant rhetoric in the 1870s and 1880s,
partly in response to the changing international situation, acquires a
sharper ‘us versus them’ and nationalist edge. In the late 1870s
Herbert Spencer’s phrase, ‘survival of the fittest’ (which had been
coined only the previous decade) began to filter into the vocabulary
of colonial bourgeoisie and better-educated colonists generally. By
the 1880s and 1890s, when Britain’s imperial and industrial
hegemony came under challenge globally, the phrase, and the
associated worry about survival, filtered into the vocabulary of artisans
and workmen, too. In the 1870s and 1880s one sees, in the Australian
colonies, California and parts of western Canada,  especially British
Columbia where there had been significant Chinese immigration for
some decades,32 the dynamic inter-weaving of populist nationalism,
exploration of definitions of community and identity, civic anxiety
prompted by the rackety character (in both senses) of the institutions
of colonial self-government, and anxious material aspirations.
It is helpful in charting important aspects of the 1870s shift in the
elements of colonial anti-Chinese rhetoric to see this shift as a
variation in what classical and medieval scholars called a topos,33 a
formulaic structure of presentation where the underlying formula is
familiar to hearers or readers. In the anti-Chinese topos which became
routinised in the Australian colonies in the 1870s, vices and virtues of
Chinese immigrants were weighed in the balance, and the conclusion
reached that their immigration posed more dangers than benefits. The
topos usually took one of two forms, the blunt and the subtle. In the
blunt form virtues and vices were, in effect, weighed against one
another. This topos amounted to saying: ‘Well, Chinese have their
good points, but ...’. In its subtle form, something like a rhetorical
tour de force is aimed at: the characteristics alled praiseworthy
                                                
31 TPP, vol. 15, 1889-89, Paper 76: ‘Chinese Question: Correspondence and
Report of Conference held at Sydney, June, 1888’, p. 39.
32 On Canada, see Price, The Great White Walls are Built, passim.
33 From the Greek for ‘place’.
Ely: Clark’s Memorandum on Chinese Immigration 89
became the reason for undesirability of Chinese immigration. Use of
the topos in its subtle form is a little like shaking the Chinaman’s hand
as he is seen off the premises, or prevented from entering them. An
example of the subtle-form t pos can be found in a Sydney lecture by
the  Reverend James Jefferis on the subject of the strike by colonial
seamen in protest against employment of Chinese seamen on
Australian ships. ‘The very virtues of the Chinese [by which Jefferis
meant their industriousness and frugality] may prove more dangerous
to us than their vices. We want English civilization, English institutions,
English social life, dominant and predominant in Australia.’34
Moving closer to 1888 one finds the topos in its subtle form in an
1887 letter from Parkes to Fysh, the Tasmanian Premier, urging inter-
colonial cooperation in ‘a measure of restriction, or perhaps,more
correctly speaking, of practical prohibition’ of Chinese immigration.
The reason, Parkes wrote, was ‘the better qualities, rather than the
worst characteristics of the Chinese — their self-denial, plodding
industry, persistency of purpose, and powers of imitation – and these
striking individual qualities again in the light of the enormous
numbers of the Chinese nation — their 400 000 000, to our less than
4 000 000 of souls.’35
Turning to 1888 the same topos, but in a blunt rather than subtle
form, is also evident in Clark’s Memorandum. Duncan Gillies, the
Victorian Premier, combined subtle and blunt forms of the topos. On
the one hand, he acknowledged Chinese industry and frugality. On the
other, Chinese were ‘so entirely dissimilar [to Europeans] as to render
a blending of the peoples out of the question. They are not only of an
alien race, but they remain aliens. We have not colonisation in any true
sense of the word, but practically a sort of peaceful invasion of our
land by Chinese.’36 Sir Samuel Griffith, also combining the two forms,
drew a basically similar contrast. ‘The main’ and,
in the opinion of this government, the insuperable objection to allowing the
immigration of Chinese is the fact that they cannot be admitted to an equal
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share in the political and social institutions of the Colony. The form of
civilisation existing in the Chinese Empire, although of a complicated and in
many respects marvellous character, is essentially different from the European
civilisation which at present prevails in Australia, and which I hold to be
essential to the future welfare of the Australian Continent to preserve.37
More should be said about Clark’s reference to the ‘indurated and
renitent character’ of Chinese immigrants to the Australasian colonies.
These terms were rare, and so unfamiliar in ordinary usage that Clark
may possibly have wished to veil his meaning, at least in some
contexts. Possibly he was drawing words from some contemporary
theorising context, but if so, I have not found it. Nor have the
compilers of entries for those words in the Oxford English Dictionary,
who give many examples of their use, but none from sociological,
ethnological or anthropological settings. Both terms, according to that
dictionary, had been in occasional use for several centuries. Mostly,
the words referred to physical objects — objects were said to be
renitent or indurated — but sometimes each had theological
connotations, or could be used to charactise an attitude. When applied
to objects, character or attitudes ‘indurated’ mostly carried the sense
of hardened, obdurate or (to use a metaphor) indelible, while
‘renitent’ carried the meaning of resistant to pressure, unyielding or
(a word that brought embarrassment to a recent Australian Prime
Minister) recalcitrant.
However, whatever Clark precisely had in mind, there can be little
doubt that he was, by implication, taking sides in a contemporary
debate over the character of human evolution. Over against the
Lockean concept of human nature as a tabula rasa (a tablet scraped
clean of impressions) whose character is formed afresh in every
generation through adaptation to situation and environment, Clark is
in effect siding with Herbert Spencer and the Lamarckians, whose
model of human evolution posited the transformation, perhaps
through natural selection, of acquired into innate characteristics — a
process whereby iterated successful adaptations, through generations,
which solved situational problems of the same kind, becomes a
genetically transmitted disposition to confront that kind of problem-
situation in the same way. Clark in the Memorandum is probably
taking sides in this debate in a semi-coded way (for ‘indurated’ or
‘renitent’ read ‘innate’), and while in ‘The Future of the Australian
Commonwealth’ he nowhere asserts that acquired characteristics are
inherited, that essay is perhaps most naturally read as implying this.
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Reflections on the Tasmanian Political context
Clark’s use of the semi-oblique ‘indurated’ and ‘renitent’ may reflect
a particular political circumstance. The Premier, Philip Fysh, did not
share Clark’s view as to the inherent unassimilability of Chinese
immigrants. There is compelling evidence of this. Fysh had supported
the 1887 Tasmanian legislation but his reasons contrasted interestingly
with Clark’s logically tortuous effort to explain restrictive legislation
as a response to weighty civic considerations rather than to political
pressure from labourers and artisans. Fysh would have none of this.
His ostensible reason for supporting the legislation is evide t from
what he said during the debate in the Legislative Council, and from a
letter he wrote shortly afterwards.
In the Legislative council debate he referred in some detail to the
situation which had developed in California, where ‘there had been
almost a continuous war of races’. He did acknowledge that the
colony’s population [which according to the 1881 c nsus stood at
844] was then between 1500 and 180038 and that ‘if they continued to
arrive at the rate recently going on their presence would soon be
materially felt’. Therefore he supported restrictive legislation to keep
their numbers ‘between safe and convenient limits’. However the only
danger and inconvenience he saw in prospect, should restrictive
legislation not pass, was to the Colony’s treasury and, should Chinese
become indigent, its charitable institutions. He said, indeed emphasised
by saying twice, that the ground of the proposed legislation was
                                                
38 Fysh’s vagueness about the number is hard to understand. Only in part can it be
explained by the fact that the last census had been in 1881. One task of the
Government Statistician was to regularly tabulate the progressive result of
births, deaths, departures and arrivals. Documentation related to the last-named
(from ship’s masters, Customs, etc) provided information on (among other
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15 July 1887 to agitate for restriction of Chinese immigration one of the
speakers, Col. St Hill, a House of Assembly member who supported the
government, said that the Government Statistician (R M Johnston) told him that
the Chinese population of Tasmania at that time was 1300 (Mercury 16 July).
Illegal arrivals, including illegal arrival of Chinese, were, in the real world,
inevitable, and given that stories of wealth from tin in the Island’s north-east
were bound to circulate in the Chinese diaspora, it was reasonable to assume that
illegal Chinese arrivals would exceed illegal Chinese departures. That perhaps
goes some way to explaining the disparity between the estimate St Hill
attributed to Johnston, and that of Fysh.
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‘expediency and revenue purposes’. His meaning seems to have been
that proceeds of the proposed poll tax would offset added costs to
government occasioned by Chinese arrivals. He regretted the Colony
was no longer being able to be so hospitable to brethren from other
lands, especially ones who had proved of great value in the local
mining industry (and kept Hobart continually supplied with fresh
vegetables). If he continued on theselines, he mused aloud, some
‘would think he was not in sympathy with his own Bill. (Cheers).’ By
most standards, this was an underwhelming speech!39 Fysh could be
more concise, however. The ‘actuating impulse’ for the Bill, he wrote
to Sir Henry Parkes shortly after it had became law was from the
‘labouring classes’. ‘Nations and colonies must be governed’, he
continued,
and certainly where democracy exists will be governed, so as to promote the
prosperity of their own people; and an undue influx of foreigners who bring
no capital but their labour, will ever be regarded as prejudicial to the interests
of those who have to compete with them in the labour markets.
Fysh considered that whatever the habits and vices of the Chinese may
be,
they are possibly the more offensive only because they are less cloaked than
the evil habits and vices of our own people. Generally, they may be regarded
as a law-abiding industrious class, whose presence would not only be
tolerated, but courted, were it not that they were regarded by our labouring
classes as undesirable competitors in the struggle for existence.40
Although I have found no direct evidence of dispute between Clark
and Fysh over government policy in relation to Chinese immigration,
it is evident that their views were at variance41 nd that, in formulating
                                                
39 Mercury, 27 October 1887.
40 TPP, vol. 15, 1888-89, Paper 76, pp. 5-6. Fysh’s relaxed view of dangers posed
by Chinese immigration is evident in his response to reports of extensive entry
of Chinese at Darwin, and the worry to some that this would escalate. Samuel
Griffith, the Queensland Premier, proposal that, because of the ‘serious danger’
this represented to other colonies, Tasmania should join them in urging the
South Australian legislature to restrict the northern incursion. This elicited from
Fysh what one can with hindsight call a Fysh-type response. He urged that the
South Australian legislature restrict the ‘influx’ into its Territory ‘within
moderate bounds’. Telegrams from Griffith and to Playford, the South Australian
Premier, and from Fysh to Playford, are in TPP, vol. 15, 1888-89, Paper 76, p.
5.
41 To be precise, it is likely that at some time in 1887 the two came to be at
variance. In an election speech in March 1887 Clark said, at a public meeting,
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Government policy on immigration, sometimes it was Fysh (or more
broadly those who from whatever motive inclined to minimal
legislative discrimination against Chinese immigration) who called the
shots, and sometimes Clark (and those who from whatever motive
inclined toward maximalist restriction). There is of course artificiality
in scoring, as I shall presently do, point to the Fysh-tendency, point to
the Clark-tendency, and so on.  Other members of the Government
party had views, and certainly had votes in both caucus and legislature,
and the views of some can be identified, mostly through debates on
the Bill. The approximate quipoise of Fysh-type outcomes and
Clark-type outcomes, in the analysis which follows, offers some basis
for inferring a corresponding balance of view points, somewhere.  The
reservation ‘somewhere’ is important, for it is a serious question
whether, in dynamic terms, the locus of the approximate equipoise was
the Government, or the legislature as a whole.  What gives this question
bite is the fact all other members of Fysh’s cabinet, B S Bird
(Treasurer), E N C Braddon (Minister of Lands and Works and Leader
of the Government in the House of Assembly) and G P Fitzgerald
(Minister without portfolio), whether or not they precisely agreed with
everything in Clark’s Memorandum, supported legislative restriction
of Chinese immigration with no sign of Fysh’s pained and
conspicuous regret that discriminatory restriction was necessary at
all.42  
                                                                                                             
that ‘he did not think it necessary to legislate against an influx of Chinese at the
present time’, Mercury 4 March 1887. Why did Clark change his mind? Two
possibly linked factors may be relevant. One is increased Chinese immigration
to Tasmania; the other anti-Chinese Tasmanian working class and artisan
militance that had become politically articulate by mid-1887. While Clark in the
Memorandum denied that Tasmanian restriction of Chinese immigration was the
fruit of the colony’s democratic institution, working class and artisan votes were
significant in his election. And well he knew it, capitalising politically on his
own artisan background. He told an election meeting on 24 February 1887 that
‘though he was a freetrader he had worked as an artisan with many who were in
the hall at his father’s foundry, and could be depended upon not to advocate any
measure that he believed would harm the working classes or their families.’
42 Bird was not present during the debate on Chinese immigration in the House of
Assembly on 20 September 1887, but at a meeting in the Hobart Town hall on
15 July 1887, convened by the Trades and Labour Council, to protest the ‘influx’
of Chinese immigrants and seek government legislation to restrict it, he wrote a
letter, to be read out, as a ‘sympathiser’ with the objects of the meeting.
Braddon described the ‘influx’ as an ‘evil’ and ‘alarming’.  ‘Are we’, he
rhetorically asked, ‘to allow the physical and material degradation to our race.’
In the debate in the House of Assembly on 20 September, supporting exemption
of Chinese females from the poll tax, he gave as the reason that if this
encouraged Chinese men to bring their wives, this would avert ‘the terrible
94 Ely: Clark’s Memorandum on Chinese Immigration
If the locus of equipoise between hot and tepid restrictionists43 was
the legislature as a whole, it is circumstantially plausible to see the line
of division as, to an extent, corresponding with that between the two
Houses.  The voting on the Bill in the two Houses tends to point this
way. In the House of Assembly the only two challenges to the Bill
were defeated by ten votes to six and ten votes to four respectively —
comfortable majorities — and this even without the votes of Bird and
Fitzgerald, who had expressed strong prospective support for it at the
protest meeting of 15 July.  The problem facing the Bill was the
Legislative Council. There it survived into a second reading by a
majority of one.  In committee, he House, by a majority of one,
defeated a section which Fysh said was a vital part of the Bill.  Fysh
did not quite lie down, perhaps piqued by failure of the absent ones to
honour presumed undertakings given, perhaps by the opportunism of
fellow Councillors more watchful than he.  He questioned whether a
vote taken when two members of the House were absent had the
requisite finality.  That of course was for the House itself to decide.
After extended debate, leave was granted to sit later. The contentious
clause was then restored, again by a majority of one.  It is certainly
reasonable to wonder if Council renitence, or even just the ever-
continuing idea of the prospect of it, sometimes gave Fysh significant
leverage against hotter restrictionists in his government.
Parts of Clark’s Memorandum must have been distasteful to Fysh
(certainly the reference to indurated and renitent vices and virtues, and
possibly, since Fysh’s nationalism was tempered by strong empire
                                                                                                             
degradation to those who resulted from the admixture of Chinese with
Europeans.’  G P Fitzgerald told the meeting convened by the Trades and Labour
Council on 15 July 1887 that he ‘believed in the Anglo-Saxon race reserving to
itself these Australias for the development of the go d old British type of
manhood.’ He then moved to an argument broadly similar to one in Clark’s
Memorandum: ‘It was our duty to raise the lowest class amongst us in the social
scale, and that would be rendered much harder by allowing Chinamen to come
here in large numbers.’ He added reflections, based on personal observations as a
visitor to California, of problems created for that State by ‘a lower structure of
celestials there’.  
43 Sidebottom’s distinction between ‘racism of the righteous’ and ‘dignified
racism’, in his 1974 study of 1880s Tasmanian attitudes to Chinese, broadly
corresponds with this. Sidebottom, ‘Racism of the Righteous’, p. 12 and
passim. The debate in the Tasmanian legislature is summarised and discussed on
pp. 26-33 of Sidebottom’s thesis. There is a concise summary of the debate in
Price, The Great White Walls are Built, pp. 184-5.
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loyalism,44 Clark’s reference to Tasmania having the rights of a ‘state’
in respect to legislating on immigration to its territories) yet on 2 May
Fysh said publicly that the Memorandum represented the view of
cabinet.45  So, point to Clark and company. In the next month (June
1888), at the Inter-colonial Conference on the ‘Chinese Question’,
where Fysh was the sole Tasmanian representative, one sees a Fysh of a
different stripe. He dissented from both the Conference decision ‘That
further restriction of Chinese immigration is essential to the welfare of
the people of Australasia’, and the draft of a Bill to implement that
decision. Fysh’s dissent concluded with words which tend to imply
that while he considered that the ‘character’ of Chinese immigrants
might create difficulty for a British colony when they arrived in large
numbers, he did not see that character as ‘indurated’ or ‘renitent’:
Tasmania dissents from the main purposes of the Draft Bill because no
exception is made which would enable Chinese residents to improve their
social condition by the introduction of their wives. It ignores the rights of
such naturalised British subjects as may be at present absent from the
Colonies who have children in the Colonies born of British wives and have
accumulated property under the sanction Colonial laws.
So, point to Fysh and minimalist restrictionists. When Fysh explained
and defended his dissent at the June 1888 Conference to the
Legislative Council on 26 June he referred briefly but in
complimentary terms to Clark’s memorandum.46 He was still a team
player, as he doubtless expected Clark to remain.
The question of the extent to which the Chinese Immigration
Restriction Act found support beyond the labouring and artisan
population, and those moved by prudential or sentimental ‘federal’
considerations, is unanswerable. Significant resistance in the
Legislative Council suggests, although not compellingly, that the Act
was far from universally popular. Perhaps a more telling pointer to
elements of indifference or hostility to the Act can be found in the
island’s newspapers. The two leading Hobart papers, the Mercury and
the Tasmanian News, were hearty supporters of restriction and the poll
tax.47 But the Tasmanian Mail (same proprietor as the Mercury, but
different editor) regarded the Act as unnecessary and unjust. In
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constitution in London, 1900.
45 Tasmanian News, 2 May 1888.
46 Mercury, 27 May 1888.
47 Mercury, 16 July 1887; Tasmanian News, 16 July 1887.
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Launceston, the Examiner did not, as far as I can tell, take an editorial
position, but on 1 December 1887 praised as ‘an able statement’ and
‘well reasoned’ a locally-produced pamphlet strongly critical of
discriminatory taxing of Chinese immigrants to Tasmania. The review
closes by quoting, and by implication endorsing the author’s hope
‘that instead of the fierce arguments of partisanship and racial hatred,
we shall hear the gentle rhyme of the words, “freedom, manhood,
brotherhood”.’ The (Launceston) Daily Telegraph in its editorial of
23 October 1887 praised the pamphlet, which it quoted from
extensively, in terms not less strong. It should be read by ‘all who wish
to study the Chinese question from an unprejudiced standpoint.’ The
paper continued summarising, commending and commenting on the
pamphlet in an editorial of 11 January 1888, prefacing this by
reflections from the international standpoint: colonial laws restricting
Chinese immigration had become obnoxious to the Chinese
government, and should China become allied to Russia, neither the
Indian Empire nor Britain’s far eastern colonies would be safe.  The
editorialist in the (Hobart) Tasmanian Mail was even more impressed
by the pamphlet: in three successive issues close to the whole pamphlet
(which was of sixteen pages) was reproduced.48 In th  third article the
editor concludes with a cry of moral indignation: it was outrageous for
the English to demand ‘perfect freedom’ to travel and trade in China,
while denying the same freedom to Chinese in Australia. He did not
doubt that some day this injustice would recoil on the heads of
Australian colonist.49
I should briefly note a remarkable feature of the pamphlet in
question. Its title was ‘The Chinese Question — Impartially Analysed
by a Chinese-Australian.’ The writer was a twenty-one year old store-
keeper from Gould’s Country in north-east Tasmania. His name was
Thomas Bak Hup. He claimed unusual qualifications to write on the
question, which ‘neither Chinaman nor Englishman can possess’:
While belonging to neither of these peoples, he still belongs to oth of
them. In other words, he is a half-caste. To him the British and Chinese
Empires are equally dear, and the Anglo-Saxon and Chinese races equally
akin. The honour and glory of each equally arouse his pride and his
patriotism; therefore he may be expected to treat the subject without either
national or racial prejudice.50
                                                
48 26 November, 3 December, 10 December 1887.
49 10 December.
50 Thomas Bak Hap (or Back Hup according to the Tasmanian Mail) was later
known —indeed well known — to Tasmanians and Australians as Thomas
Bakhap. What he claimed as his two ‘dears’ — the British and Chinese empires
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— remained that. Perhaps the former then included — it certainly did later —
Australia as a nation coming-into-being. He was and remained fluent in
Cantonese, and taught himself to read Mandarin. In Sydney in the late 1890s he
was, on his own account, an ardent federationist. He was at the ‘storm centre ...
at the critical stage of the movement’. He believed he ‘probably influenced as
many votes in favour of the establishment of the Australian Commonwealth as
any other private nationalist’. (Letter from Thomas J K Bakhap, Clipper
(Hobart), 29 July 1903. I am grateful to Michael Roe for drawing my attention to
this letter.) By this time he supported immigration restriction. ‘Doubtless it is
wise,’ he said in the same letter, ‘to prevent any great inrush of non-caucasian
races until our nation feels its feet.’ But the Chinese side of Bakhap is evident
the spin he puts on this concession. Against the worries of those who feared
racial deterioration arising from miscegenation, he took the view that the effect
of judicious racial inter-breeding would be to strengthen the Australian stock.
And the verve of the 1887 pamphlet remained evident. ‘Let some or all of the
races of mankind come in, and let us have a blend. Only the blended people are of
any account. ... Therefore think of me as a supporter of a blended or piebald
Australia.’ The Chinese side of Bakhup is also evident in the contempt he
expressed for any ‘Australian or alien of semi-alien extraction who calls for the
exclusion of races from which his own “soul case” has been derived.’
There remained some distance between Bakhap’s metaphoric account of the
preconditions of emergent national excellence and Inglis Clark’s almost
exactly contemporaneous view, in ‘The Future of the Australian
Commonwealth’ (reproduced in this book), that consanguineity and
homolingualness were necessary conditions for development of national
maturity — the kind of maturity, Clark added, which makes possible the largest
contribution of that nation ‘to the multiform civilizations of the world.’ In
1903, unlike 1887, Bakhap and Clark were within cooee distance of each other,
except that Bakhap’s dual sentimental loyalisms — to the British and Chinese
empires — would not have meshed well with Clark’s continued republicanism.
In that respect Bakhup would have stood closer to Fysh or Alfred Deakin. Such
is the whirligig of history.
Bakhap stayed on the same dual affinity course. He was Labor member for Bass
in the House of Assembly from 1909 to 1913, and a National Party member for
Tasmania from 1917 to his death in 1923, but at the same time kept close links
to the Chinese community in Tasmania and elsewhere, and made no secret of
being one with them, too. S M Bruce regarded Bakhap as the government’s
leading authority on China and south-east Asia. He travelled to China several
times, the last time (in 1922) on a fact finding mission for the government.
Bakhap is the subject of an extended article by Hilary Rubinstein in The
Biographical Dictionary of the Australian Senate, Melbourne, 2000, and a
pioneering 1992 University of Tasmania B A (hons) thesis by Gordon Black, ‘T
J K Bakhap (1866-1923): A Chinese-Australian?’ In general, Rubinstein’s
article is careful and scholarly, although her findings are open to criticism or
doubt in a few respects. Bakhap’s 1887 pamphlet (of which, apparently, no
copy survives) was not prepared ‘for a forthcoming inter-colonial conference on
Chinese immigration’, but, as made plain by reviewers in the local press, a
protest against the 1887 Chinese Immigration Restriction Bill. Rubinstein
describes the pamphlet as ‘anonymous’, and possibly it was issued as from a
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How representative were what one might call the liberal humanist
voices of the reviewers of Bak Hap’s pamphlet? The bare survival of
the Restriction Bill in the Legislative Council certainly makes that
question worth asking, but if one assumes that the distribution of views
and attitudes to Chinese immigrants in Tasmania was similar to that in
other colonies (which cannot be absurd) one must conclude that the
voices of the reviewers were those of a minority. That conclusion is
supported by a remark of the Tasmanian Mail writer: he was
‘conscious of being in a small minority’. The extensiveness of the
favourable notice of Bak Hap’s pamphlet is, however, hard to explain
without supposing that a chord was touched among more than small
coteries of Sinophiles. The more basic (and also harder) question is: if
one adds to what I have called the liberal humanist voices of these
journalists those, such as Fysh’s, who supported discriminatory
legislation though with regret, would that minority still be small?
Inclusive humaneness in British-Australian culture, as with liberality
generality, has since early settlement been so much a function of
circumstances and situational particularity, as well a disposition, that
this question may be simply unanswerable.
By the close of the decade the initial conditions of inter-racial
tension in Tasmania were less in evidence. Perhaps because of the
                                                                                                             
‘Chinese-Australian’. However it was not anonymous in a strong sense, since
the reviewers acknowledged having received it from him personally.  My last
critical comment is more a reservation as to one of her conclusions. Rubinstiein
notes that Bakhap’s Irish-Australian mother married Gee Bak Hap when Thomas
was two years of age, so becoming his step-father; that on the certificate of
Thomas’s birth two years earlier, no father was identified, and that the mother’s
name was given as Kingston. Rubinstein also notes that the mother’s birth-
name was Margaret Hogan. At some time after the marriage between Bak Hap
and Margaret Thomas took or was given, as his full name, Thomas J rome
Kingston Bakhap. Rubinstein infers from this that Bakhap was ‘entirely’ of
‘Caucasian origin’. That, in my view, is not a conclusion the evidence warrants.
Without question, it is possible Bakhap’s part-Chineseness was elected rather
than genetic. It is the categorical denial which has no feet. Rubinstein’s claim
would gain plausibility had she found a contemporary of Backhap’s who
publicly denied or even doubted that he was racially half-Chinese. The closest
she gets (footnote 1, p. 434) is having met someone (Ms Dinah Hall) who
recalled either that Thomas Bakhap’s mother said his father was Spanish, or that
someone said she said this. The footnote is equivocal as to whether what is
meant is a memory of a memory of a statement, or a memory of a memory of a
memory of a statement of Thomas’s mother. Whichever, this is does not come
to much, evidentially.   On balance, while we may never be certain, it is more
reasonable, on evidence presently available, to affirm than deny that Bakhap
was the first of Australia’s part-Chinese legislators.
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restrictive legislation, perhaps more because yield from the north-east
tin-fields had declined, the Tasmanian census of 1891 showed a
marked decline in the Chinese population of the island, to 944.51
Postscript
Was Clark a racist?
When one transposes a yardstick derived from present-day fine-tuned scholarly
reflection on precisely what constitutes racism in speech, action and attitude52 to
nineteenth century dwellers in Australia — whether these dwellers were
Europeans, Aborigines, Chinese or Pacific islanders — it is hard not to conclude
that many, or perhaps the lot, were racist in multiple senses. However, that is
only a discovery of moment if it significantly enhances our understanding of the
springs of their thought and action, individual and collective. Wielding the racist
yardstick, that is, must deliver a charge for the measurer beyond moral s lf-
gratification. Some scholarly writings noted above enrich historical
understanding of other days and other ways, for instance (but not only) studies by
Markus, Price, Willard, Curthoys, Markey, Hirst and Cronin. Geoffrey Blainey’s
substantive historical studies (that is, excluding the polemical All For Australia,
just because it is largely polemical) sometimes refer to Chinese immigrants in
the nineteenth century, but because he largely does so in an anecdotal and
unreferenced way, use of them is question-begging. This does not mean that any
particular Blainey’s re-interpretations is, as such, on the wrong side of truth, but
simply that, in terms of conventional canons of historical scholarship, they do
not stand on their own feet evidentially. All for Australia deserves notice, but not
in the task of considering whether Clark’s Memorandum was racist, but for in
effect showing that arguments, in form broadly like some in Clark’s
Memorandum, retain popular currency.
So, cautiously, to the substantive issue. Was Clark’s view that, in
something like an innate way, Chinese were averse to adapting to the
institutions of civil society a racist view? Does the answer depend on whether, in
point of fact, it was true or false that this aversion was innate? Does the answer
turn, rather, on whether belief in this aversion was widespread in mainstream
science of the time? If it was a mainstream view, though contested, that
generically Chinese are innately renitent in something like the way Clark
asserted, and if Clark believed this as what scientific evidence obliged him to
believe, would Clark’s statement of that belief be racist? And would actively
supporting a State’s restriction or prohibition of Chinese immigration, in the
                                                
51 Figures on the population of Chinese in Tasmania in 1881 and 1891, according
to the census of those years, are in the article ‘Chinese’, in James Jupp (ed.), The
Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins,
Sydney, 1988, p. 299. This section of the article was written by Sing-Wu Wang.
52 A fine-honed example is M Clyne, ‘Language and Racism’, in A Markus and R
Rasmussen (eds), Prejudice in the Public Arena, Melbourne, 1987.
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way that Clark did, be racist? The double-hypothetical represents a big ask; but if
both hypotheticals held, it would in my view be unreasonable to describe Clark
as a racist, in any pejorative sense of that word.53 As it happens, the Clark
papers testify amply to Clark’s Darwinian-Spencerian enthusiasm, and contain an
impassioned statement that against he abandonment of ‘reason’ his ‘whole
nature cries out’,54 but there is almost nothing in them about China or the
Chinese, so we have nothing like a statement from Clark about how he came to
believe that Chinese were congenitally unwilling and unable to comply with
civil society’s requirements. We all know it is possible with anyone, including
Clark, for beliefs claimed as scientific to be ex post facto rationalisations of pre-
judgement; but nothing in the relevant Clark Papers shouts out this possibility.
Clark’s Memorandum itself, however, perhaps points to a context and source
of his opposition to Chinese immigration. The Chinese paragraphs can plausibly
be read as a deduction from his study, which we know was close, of the recent
history of the United States. I will not repeat Clark’s argument, but note only
his conclusion, that if Chinese became nearly as numerous in Australasia as
‘residents of European origin’ this would create ‘a combined political and
industrial division of society on the basis of racial distinction.’ Clark, as admirer
of Comte and Spencer, took a high view of the standing, as science, of recent
work in the social and political sciences. His argument in the paragraphs on the
Chinese are in the idiom of social and political science in that sense, and very
likely meant to be read that way.
They also can be read as expressing a sense of urgency. If so, they probably
were occasioned by extensive and often alarmist literature from and about
Chinese immigrants in California, which was widely available in Tasmania, and
with which Clark must have been familiar. As noted in the previous section,
references to the California situation were frequent in the July 1887 protest
meeting on Chinese immigration, and the September-October 1887 debates in
parliament on the Chinese Immigration Act.The Mercury contained a regular
(usually weekly) report from the San Francisco Mail News. Or, possibly, the
language described as expressive of a sense of urgency might more accurately be
said to express an emotionally distanced distaste. (Consider the phrase ‘bred in
them’)
Did any of Clark’s contemporaries say anything as to Clark’s attitude, as
disclosed in the memorandum, to Chinese immigrants? I have found but one who
did, the writer of a quasi-editorial comment on the Memorandum in the
Tasmanian Mail of 5 May 1888. He described it as ‘couched in moderate and
                                                
53 M C Ricklefs, ‘Why Asians?’, in A Markus & M Rickefs (eds), Surrender
Australia: Essays in the Study and Uses of History: Geoffrey Blainey and Asian
Immigration, Sydney, 1985, p. 45, defines raci m as belief that ‘there are
groups within the human population which are genetically homogeneous among
themselves and among which significant distinctions can be drawn’. For reasons
given in the text I do not consider this a satisfactory definition of racism. In the
unlikely event that the belief was true the use of ‘racist’ and ‘racism’ in a
pejorative sense would become otiose.
54 University of Tasmania Archives, Clark Papers, C4/F34 (Untitled speech).
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guarded language’.  This would have little credibility if it came from one who
saw Chinese as a danger. But it didn’t. The editor of the Mail, as shown in the
last section, was both a strong critic of the 1887 Chinese Immigration Act and a
keen admirer of the Chinese.
So how far was Clark, while ostensibly seeking to avert the ‘political and
industrial division of society on the basis of race distinction’, nonetheless a
racist? I am sure some, perhaps pointing to Clark’s seemingly dismissive words
‘bred in them’, would say, ‘That’s the tell-tale phrase. Yes he was!’ I’m just as
sure others would say, No. My own view is that we don’t know enough about
Clark, or deeper currents of presupposition of his time and place, to safely say.
